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STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
This Court has scheduled oral argument for Wednesday, June 8, 2011 in
Atlanta, Georgia.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
AMENDED CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS 
AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ....................................................................... 1
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ............................................................. 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1
STATEMENT OF FACTS ...................................................................................... 7
I. Background ......................................................................................... 7
A. The interstate market for health care services 
differs from other markets in critical respects .......................... 7
B. Private or government insurance is the principal 
means used to pay for health care services, and 
the federal government’s involvement in health 
care financing is pervasive ....................................................... 9
C. As a class, people who endeavor to pay for health 
care services through means other than insurance 
shift significant costs to other participants in the 
interstate health care market ................................................... 10
D. Before the Affordable Care Act, the percentage 
of people with private health insurance steadily 
decreased ................................................................................. 12
II. The Affordable Care Act ................................................................... 13
STANDARD OF REVIEW ................................................................................... 16
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ............................................................................. 16
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 24
I. The Minimum Coverage Provision Is a Valid Exercise 
of Congress’s Commerce Power ....................................................... 24
A. The minimum coverage provision regulates the 
way people pay for health care services, a class 
of economic activity that substantially affects 
interstate commerce ................................................................ 25
1. The minimum coverage provision regulates 
the practice of obtaining health care services 
without insurance, a practice that shifts 
substantial costs to other participants in the 
health care market ........................................................ 26
2. The minimum coverage provision is essential to 
ii
the Act’s guaranteed-issue and community-rating 
insurance reforms ......................................................... 28
B. The minimum coverage provision is a necessary 
and proper means of regulating interstate commerce ............. 32
1. The provision is plainly adapted to the 
unique conditions of the health care market ................ 32
2. Congress can regulate participants in the 
health care market even if they are not 
currently “active” in the insurance market ................... 38
3. The minimum coverage provision regulates 
economic activity as part of a broad regulation 
of interstate commerce, and bears no resemblance 
to the statutes in Lopez and Morrison .......................... 45
II. The Minimum Coverage Provision Is Also Independently 
Authorized by Congress’s Taxing Power ......................................... 50
III. The District Court Impermissibly Departed from Controlling 
Doctrine in Declaring the Affordable Care Act Invalid in Its 
Entirety and in Awarding Relief to Parties Without Standing ......... 55
iii
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 62
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases: Page
Abbott Labs. v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 136 (1967) .......................................................................................... 60
Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coal. v. Kempthorne,
477 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2007) .................................................................. 42, 44
Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 
480 U.S. 678 (1987) ......................................................................................... 56
Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico,
458 U.S. 592 (1982) .......................................................................................... 61
Ashwander v. TVA,
297 U.S. 288 (1936) .......................................................................................... 54
Astra USA, Inc. v. Santa Clara County,
__ S. Ct. __ (Mar. 29, 2011), 2011 WL 1119021 ............................................ 56
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England,
546 U.S. 320 (2006) .......................................................................................... 55
Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc.,
472 U.S. 491 (1985) .......................................................................................... 55
* Authorities chiefly relied upon are marked with an asterisk.
v
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294 (1962) .......................................................................................... 43
Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis,
301 U.S. 548 (1937) .................................................................................... 49, 50
Cheffer v. Reno,
55 F.3d  1517 (11th Cir. 1995) ................................................................... 44, 47
*Free Enterprise Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.,
130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010) ................................................................................ 55, 56
Freilich v. Upper Chesapeake Health, Inc.,
313 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2002) ............................................................................ 47
*Gonzales v. Raich,
545 U.S. 1 (2005) ....................................... 18, 24, 25, 27, 28, 33, 34, 40, 41, 43
Harry v. Marchant,
291 F.3d 767 (11th Cir. 2002) .......................................................................... 36
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,
379 U.S. 241 (1964) .................................................................................... 47, 48
Helvering v. Davis,
301 U.S. 619 (1937) .......................................................................................... 49
vi
Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,
452 U.S. 264 (1981) .......................................................................................... 49
Liberty University Inc. v. Geithner,
__ F. Supp. 2d __ (W.D. Va. 2010), 2010 WL 4860299 ........................... 39, 40
Massachusetts v. EPA,
549 U.S. 497 (2007) .......................................................................................... 23
Massachusetts v. Mellon,
262 U.S. 447 (1923) .............................................................................. 23, 61, 62
McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. 316 (1819) ................................................................................ 18, 25, 33
Mead Corp. v. Tilley,
490 U.S. 714 (1989) .................................................................................... 58, 59
Mead v. Holder,
__ F. Supp. 2d __ (D.D.C. 2011), 2011 WL 611139 ....................................... 40
Missouri v. Illinois,
180 U.S. 208 (1901) .......................................................................................... 61
Murphy v. IRS,
493 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 2007) .......................................................................... 50
vii
*Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
312 U.S. 359 (1941) .................................................................................... 21, 50
New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. 144 (1992) ......................................................................................... 56
Nortz v. United States,
294 U.S. 317 (1935) .......................................................................................... 44
Nw. Austin Mun. Utility Dist. No. One v. Holder,
129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009) ...................................................................................... 54
Perez v. United States, 
402 U.S. 146 (1971) ......................................................................................... 28
Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898 (1997) .................................................................................... 59, 60
Regan v. Time, Inc.,
468 U.S. 641 (1984) .............................................................................. 23, 57, 58
Roberts v. Galen of Virginia, Inc.,
525 U.S. 249 (1999) .......................................................................................... 36
Sabri v. United States,
541 U.S. 600 (2004) .......................................................................................... 45
viii
Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc.,
529 U.S. 1 (2000) .............................................................................................. 60
Sonzinsky v. United States,
300 U.S. 506 (1937) .................................................................................... 50, 51
Swift Co. v. United States,
196 U.S. 375 (1905) .......................................................................................... 43
Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama,
720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010) ..................................................... 32, 40
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,
520 U.S. 180 (1997) .......................................................................................... 25
United States v. Belfast,
611 F.3d 783 (11th Cir. 2010) .......................................................................... 34
United States v. Comstock,
130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010) .................................................................... 25, 33, 34, 36
United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100 (1941) .............................................................................. 33, 43, 49
United States v. Jackson,
390 U.S. 570 (1968) .......................................................................................... 58
ix
United States v. LaFranca,
282 U.S. 568 (1931) .......................................................................................... 52
United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995) ........................................................................ 20, 38, 43, 46
United States v. Maxwell,
386 F.3d 1042 (11th Cir. 2004) ........................................................................ 42
United States v. Maxwell,
446 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2006) .......................................... 24, 25, 29, 42, 44, 45
United States v. Moghadam,
175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999) ........................................................................ 52
United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000) ................................................................................... 45, 46
United States v. Sanchez,
340 U.S. 42 (1950) ............................................................................................ 50
United States v. Smith,
459 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2006) ........................................................................ 29
United States v. Sotelo,
436 U.S. 268 (1978) .......................................................................................... 50
x
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n,
322 U.S. 533 (1944) .................................................................................... 28, 47
United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co.,
315 U.S. 110 (1942) .......................................................................................... 33
Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius,
728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010) ............................................................... 58
Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942) .............................................................................. 27, 41, 43
Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co.,
333 U.S. 138 (1948) .......................................................................................... 52
Constitution:
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 .................................................................................... 50
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 .................................................................................... 24
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 .................................................................................. 24
Statutes:
18 U.S.C. § 2252(c) ............................................................................................... 44
21 U.S.C. § 301 ...................................................................................................... 10
21 U.S.C. § 351 ...................................................................................................... 10
26 U.S.C.A. § 36B(a) ............................................................................................. 14
xi
26 U.S.C.A. § 36B(b) ............................................................................................ 14
26 U.S.C.A. § 45R ................................................................................................. 13
26 U.S.C.A. § 4980H ......................................................................................... 5, 14
26 U.S.C.A. § 4980H(b)(1) ................................................................................... 53
26 U.S.C.A. § 4980H(b)(2) ................................................................................... 53
26 U.S.C.A. § 4980H(c)(2)(D) .............................................................................. 53
26 U.S.C.A. § 4980H(d)(1) ................................................................................... 53
26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A ................................................................................... 2, 15, 50
26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(a) ........................................................................................ 51
26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(a)-(c) ................................................................................... 52
26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(b)(2) ................................................................................... 51
26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(b)(3) ................................................................................... 51
26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(b)(3)(B) .............................................................................. 51
26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(c) ................................................................................. 51, 52
26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(e) ....................................................................................... 15
26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(e)(2) .............................................................................. 51, 52
26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(e)(5) .................................................................................... 52
26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(f) ......................................................................................... 15
26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(g) ........................................................................................ 51
xii
26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(g)(2)(A) .............................................................................. 52
28 U.S.C. § 1291 ...................................................................................................... 1
28 U.S.C. § 1331 ...................................................................................................... 1
42 U.S.C. § 264(b) ................................................................................................. 10
42 U.S.C. § 300gg .................................................................................................. 15
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1(a) .......................................................................................... 15
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3(a) .......................................................................................... 15
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-11 ............................................................................................ 15
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-12 ............................................................................................ 15
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd ................................................................................................ 36
42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) ................................................................ 14
42 U.S.C.A. § 18031 .......................................................................................... 5, 14
42 U.S.C.A. § 18071 .............................................................................................. 14
42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(A) ............................................................... 2, 20, 26, 38
42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(B) ..................................................................... 3, 47, 49
42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(D) ............................................................................... 32
42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(F) ................................................................ 2, 11, 26, 27
42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(G) ............................................................................... 32
42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(I) ...................................................................... 3, 26, 31
xiii
42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(J) .......................................................................... 13, 26
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 395.1041(1) ................................................................................ 35
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 395.1041(3) ................................................................................ 35
Idaho Code Ann. § 39-1391b ................................................................................ 35
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:2113.4 ............................................................................ 35
Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 ........................................................... 51, 56, 57
Second Militia Act of 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271 .................................................... 44
South Carolina Code Ann. § 44-7-260(E) ............................................................. 35
Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 311.022(a) ..................................................... 35
Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 311.022(b) ..................................................... 35
Regulations:
76 Fed. Reg. 3637-02 (Jan. 20, 2011) ................................................................... 14
Legislative Materials:
47 Million and Counting: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 
110th Cong. 52 (2008) (Prof. Hall) ...................................................... 19, 30, 36
155 Cong. Rec. S12768 (Dec. 9, 2009) (Sen. Grassley) ....................................... 54
155 Cong. Rec. S13,558, S13,581-82 (Dec. 20, 2009) (Sen. Baucus) .................. 54
155 Cong. Rec. S13,751, S13,753 (Dec. 22, 2009) (Sen. Leahy) ......................... 54
155 Cong. Rec. at S13,830, S13,832 (Dec. 23, 2009) ........................................... 53
xiv
156 Cong. Rec. E506-01, 2010 WL 1133757 (Mar. 25, 2010) 
(Rep. Waxman) ................................................................................................. 27
156 Cong. Rec. H1824, H1826 (Mar. 21, 2010) (Rep. Slaughter) ........................ 54
156 Cong. Rec. H1824, H1835 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2010) 
(Rep. McGovern) .............................................................................................. 48
156 Cong. Rec. H1854, H1882 (Mar. 21, 2010) (Rep. Miller) ............................. 54
Chairman Henry A. Waxman and Rep. Bart Stupak, Memorandum on 
Coverage Denials for Pre-Existing Conditions in the Individual 
Health Insurance Market to H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce 
(Oct. 12, 2010) .................................................................................................. 30
Chairman Waxman and Rep. Stupak, Memorandum on Maternity 
Coverage in the Individual Health Insurance Market to H. Comm. 
on Energy & Commerce (Oct. 12, 2010) ......................................................... 30
Expanding Consumer Choice and Addressing “Adverse Selection” 
Concerns in Health Insurance, Hearing Before the Joint Economic 
Comm. 32 (2004) (Prof. Pauly) ...................................................................... 7, 8
Health Reform in the 21st Century: Insurance Market Reforms: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 111th Cong. 117
(2009) (Phil Caper, M.D., and Joe Lendvai) .................................................... 31
xv
H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. (2009) ............................................................................. 53
H.R. 3590, Manager’s Amendment (Dec. 19, 2009) ............................................. 53
H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. (2009) ....................................................................... 53, 59
H.R. Rep. No. 99-241(I) (1985) ............................................................................ 36
H.R. Rep. No. 99-241(III) (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 726 ............. 35
H.R. Rep. No. 111-299(I) (2009) .......................................................................... 47
H.R. Rep. No. 111-443(I) (2010) .......................................................................... 53
Making Health Care Work for American Families, Hearing Before the 
H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, Subcomm. on Health, 111th 
Cong. 11 (Mar. 17, 2009) (Prof. Reinhardt) ..................................................... 31
S. Rep. No. 111-89 (2009) ............................................................................... 27, 53
S. 1796 (Oct. 19, 2009) .......................................................................................... 53
xvi
TABLE OF RECORD REFERENCES IN THE BRIEF
Brief Page # Docket #
33
3, 5, 54
11, 12, 13, 48
8, 39
10
26, 27
39
19, 30, 36
Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Dismiss (9/14/2010)
Order and Memorandum Opinion Granting in Part and
Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
(10/14/2010)
Exhibits in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment
Exhibit 2: Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”),
Key Issues In Analyzing Major Health Insurance
Proposals (Dec. 2008)
Exhibit 5: Ruger, The Moral Foundations of Health
Insurance, 100 Q.J. Med. 53 (2007)
Exhibit 9: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(“CDC”), National Center for Health Statistics,
Health, United States, 2009 (2010) (excerpt)
Exhibit 10: Herring, The Effect of the Availability of
Charity Care to the Uninsured on the Demand for
Private Health Insurance, 24 J. Health Econ. 225
(2005) (excerpt)
Exhibit 11: Pauly, Risks and Benefits in Health Care:
The View from Economics, 26 Health Affairs 653
(2007)
Exhibit 13: 47 Million and Counting: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Finance, 110th Cong. (2008)
(excerpt)
77
79
83
xvii
49
27
39
4, 5, 51
48
3
3, 4, 5, 6, 19,
20, 22, 23, 32,
33, 35, 37, 38,
40, 55, 56, 57,
58, 59, 61
6
Exhibit 17: Rosenbaum, Can States Pick Up the
Health Reform Torch?, 362 New Eng. J. Med. e29
(2010)
Exhibit 19: S. Rep. No. 111-89 (2009) (excerpt)
Exhibit 30: Porat et al., Market Insurance Versus Self
Insurance, 58 J. Risk & Ins. 657 (1991) (excerpt)
Exhibit 32: Letter from Douglas Elmendorf, Director,
CBO, to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of
Representatives (Mar. 20, 2010) (excerpt) 
District Court Amicus Curiae Brief of Governors of
Washington, Colorado, Michigan, and Pennsylvania
in Support of Defendants
                                              
Second Amended Complaint
Order Granting Summary Judgment to Plaintiffs (1/31/2011)
Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Clarify and Issuing 
a Stay Pending Appeal (3/3/2011)
133
148
150
167
xviii
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Plaintiffs invoked the district court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  The
court entered final judgment on January 31, 2011.  Defendants and the plaintiff states
filed notices of appeal on March 8, 2011 and March 10, 2011, respectively.  This
Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
1.  Whether the district court erred in holding that the minimum coverage
provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“Affordable Care Act”
or “ACA”) is not a valid exercise of Congress’s commerce power.
2.  Whether the court erred in holding that the minimum coverage provision is
not independently authorized by Congress’s taxing power.
3.  Whether, even assuming that the minimum coverage provision was invalid,
the court erred in declaring that the Affordable Care Act in its entirety is invalid and
in awarding relief to plaintiffs without standing.  
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.  The Affordable Care Act is a comprehensive reform of our national health
care system.  The Act seeks to ameliorate the crisis in the interstate market for health
care services that accounts for more than 17% of the nation’s gross domestic product. 
Millions of people without health insurance have consumed health care services for
which they do not pay.  They have thereby shifted the uncompensated costs of their
care — totaling $43 billion in 2008 — to health care providers regularly engaged in
interstate commerce.  Providers pass on much of this cost to insurance companies,
which also often operate interstate.  The result is higher premiums that, in turn, make
insurance unaffordable to even more people.  At the same time, insurers use
restrictive underwriting practices to deny coverage or charge unaffordable premiums
to millions because they have pre-existing medical conditions.
The Affordable Care Act addresses these national problems through measures
designed to make affordable health care coverage widely available, protect consumers
from restrictive underwriting, and reduce the uncompensated care obtained by the
uninsured and paid for by other participants in the health care market.
The minimum coverage provision at issue here will require non-exempted
individuals to maintain a minimum level of health insurance coverage or pay a tax
penalty.  26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A.  In enacting this provision, Congress made detailed
findings establishing a foundation for the exercise of its commerce power.  Congress
found that the provision  — which regulates how people pay for services in the
interstate health care market — “regulates activity that is commercial and economic
in nature,” 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(A); that the consumption of health care without
insurance has substantial adverse effects on the interstate health care market, id.
§ 18091(a)(2)(F); that health insurance “is sold in interstate commerce” and “pays for
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medical supplies, drugs, and equipment that are shipped in interstate commerce,” id.
§ 18091(a)(2)(B); and that the minimum coverage provision is “essential” to the Act’s 
reforms that prevent insurers from denying coverage because of an individual’s
medical condition or history, id. § 18091(a)(2)(I), insurance regulation that is an
unquestionably valid exercise of the commerce power.
2.  Plaintiffs are 26 states, two private citizens, and the National Federation of
Independent Business (“NFIB”).  Their second amended complaint included six
causes of action that challenged the constitutionality of several provisions of the
Affordable Care Act.  Record Excerpts (“RE”) 1987-96.
After considering threshold issues of standing, the district court declared that
the minimum coverage provision is not a valid exercise of Congress’s Article I
powers.  Addressing the commerce power, the court recognized that, “[i]f and when
the uninsured are injured or become ill, they receive treatment ... because in this
country medical care is generally not denied due to lack of insurance coverage or
inability to pay.”  RE 381.  The court acknowledged that the consumption of health
care without insurance imposes a substantial burden on the health care market,
shifting billions of dollars of costs to other market participants.  RE 2046, 2051-52. 
It also recognized that the minimum coverage provision is key to the Act’s provisions
that bar insurers from denying coverage because of a pre-existing medical condition
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(the guaranteed-issue requirement) and from charging higher premiums because of
a person’s medical history (the community-rating requirement). RE 2057-58. 
Without the minimum coverage provision, the court observed, people could “delay
obtaining insurance as they are now guaranteed coverage if they get sick or injured.” 
RE 2058.  Nonetheless, the court held, Congress may not require “advance purchase
of health insurance based on a future contingency that will substantially affect
commerce.”  RE 2049.  While recognizing that “Congress plainly has the power” to
regulate the way people pay for health care services, the court held that Congress may
exercise this power only “at the time that [people] initially seek medical care.” 
RE 2052.
With regard to the taxing power, the court did not dispute that the minimum
coverage provision amends the Internal Revenue Code to provide that non-exempted 
individuals who fail to maintain minimum coverage shall pay a penalty that, above 
a flat dollar amount and subject to a cap, is calculated as a percentage of their
household incomes, reported on their individual federal income tax returns for the
taxable year, and assessed and collected in the same general manner as certain other
federal tax penalties.  Nor did the court question the Congressional Budget Office
(“CBO”) projection that this provision will generate billions of dollars of revenue
each year.  See Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director, CBO, to Nancy Pelosi,
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Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, table 4 (Mar. 20, 2010).  Nonetheless, the
court held that the penalty is not a valid exercise by Congress of its taxing power
because “Congress did not call it a tax,” “state that it was acting under its taxing
authority,” or identify a “revenue-generating purpose” in the statute itself.  RE 390,
395, 396.
The court rejected all of plaintiffs’ other constitutional challenges.  In addition
to rejecting their substantive due process challenge to the minimum coverage
provision, the court rejected plaintiffs’ contention that the provision allowing states
to establish health insurance exchanges, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031, “commandeers” state
governments.  RE 425-28.  It rejected plaintiffs’ contention that provisions expanding
eligibility for Medicaid are “coercive.”  RE 2007-14.  And it rejected plaintiffs’
challenge to the employer responsibility provision, 26 U.S.C.A. § 4980H, which in
specified circumstances will impose a tax penalty on large employers that fail to make
adequate coverage available to their full-time employees.  RE 420-25.
Nevertheless, after rejecting all of these challenges except the Article I
challenge to the minimum coverage provision, the court declared the Act invalid in
its entirety.  The court acknowledged that, “[i]n a statute that is approximately 2,700
pages long and has several hundred sections — certain of which have only a remote
and tangential connection to health care — it stands to reason that some (perhaps
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even most) of the remaining provisions can stand alone and function independently
of the individual mandate.”  RE 2066.  The court also recognized that, “because a
ruling of unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of democratically-elected
representatives of the people, the ‘normal rule’ — in the ‘normal’ case — will
ordinarily require that as little of a statute be struck down as possible.”  RE 2072-73.
Nevertheless, citing the uniqueness of this case and emphasizing the absence of an
express severability clause, the court held that the minimum coverage provision is not
severable from any other provision of the Act, even those with a “remote and
tangential connection to health care.”  RE 2064-75.  The court therefore declared the
entire Act invalid.
Subsequently, the court clarified that it intended its judgment to be the practical
equivalent of an injunction with respect to the parties to this case.  RE 2142.  The
court recognized, however, that this would be “extremely disruptive,” RE 2144, and
issued a stay pending appeal contingent upon expedition, RE 2148.1
 Defendants do not dispute that plaintiff Brown’s challenge to the minimum1
coverage provision is justiciable.  See RE 2016 (holding that Brown has standing
because she must “make financial arrangements now to ensure compliance” in 2014). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
I. Background
A. The interstate market for health care services differs from other
markets in critical respects.
In responding to the crisis in the interstate health care market, Congress
confronted a market different from any other.  Spending in the interstate health care
market accounted for 17.6% of the nation’s gross domestic product in 2009.  Centers
for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”), National Health Expenditure 2009
Highlights, at 1 (2011).  Participation is essentially universal; an individual’s need for
expensive medical care is unpredictable; and, across the nation, hospitals routinely
provide — and are often legally required to provide — emergency care without regard
to ability to pay.  The market is also unique in that individuals typically pay for health
care services through private or government insurance.
Although most people obtain health care services, they cannot accurately predict
their need for such services.  “Most medical expenses for people under 65” result
“from the bolt-from-the-blue event of an accident, a stroke, or a complication of
pregnancy that we know will happen on average but whose victim we cannot (and they
cannot) predict well in advance.”  Expanding Consumer Choice and Addressing
“Adverse Selection” Concerns in Health Insurance, Hearing Before the Joint
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Economic Comm. 32 (2004) (Prof. Pauly).  Costs can mount rapidly for even the most
common significant health problems.  For example, the average cost of an
appendectomy in 2010 was $13,123.  International Federation of Health Plans, 2010
Comparative Price Report: Medical and Hospital Fees By Country, at 13.  The average
cost of a day in the hospital was $3,612; of a hospital stay, $14,427; of a
Caesarian-section, $13,016; of bypass surgery, $59,770; of an angioplasty, $29,055. 
Id. at 9, 10, 12, 16, 17.  Drug treatment for a common form of cancer costs more than
$150,000 a year.  Meropol, et al., Cost of Cancer Care: Issues and Implications, 25 J.
Clin. Oncol. 180, 182 (2007).  Thus, the potential for financially ruinous burdens is
plain, but what actually will happen to any given individual — the “frequency, timing,
and magnitude” of an individual’s demand for health care services — is generally
unknowable.  Ruger, The Moral Foundations of Health Insurance, 100 Q.J. Med. 53,
54-55 (2007).
Unlike in other markets, people receive, and expect to receive, expensive health
care services in times of need without regard to their ability to pay.  For decades, state
and federal laws have required emergency rooms to stabilize any patient who arrives
with an emergency condition, regardless of whether the person has insurance or
otherwise can pay.  See pp. 35-36, infra.
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B. Private or government insurance is the principal means used to pay
for health care services, and the federal government’s involvement
in health care financing is pervasive.
Unlike other markets, in the health care market, people usually pay for services
through private or government insurance.  In 2009, payments by private health
insurers constituted 32% of national health care spending.  CMS, 2009 National
Health Expenditure Data, table 3 (2011).  Employment-based health insurance plans
accounted for most private coverage; about 59% of the non-elderly population (156.2
million people) had employer-based health insurance in 2009.  Holahan, The 2007-09
Recession and Health Insurance Coverage, 30 Health Affairs 145, 148 (2011).  In that
year, about 5.2% of the non-elderly population (13.8 million people) had policies
purchased in the individual insurance market.  Ibid.
In 2009, federal, state, and local governments financed more than 43% of health
care spending.  CMS, 2009 National Health Expenditure Data, tables 5 & 11.  The
federal government provides health insurance for older and certain disabled persons
under Medicare, accounting for 20% of national health care spending in 2009.  Id.,
table 11.  Federal and state governments provide health benefits for low-income
persons through Medicaid, which constituted an additional 15% of national health care
spending in 2009.  Ibid.  Another 12% of health care spending reflected government
spending on other programs, such as benefits for veterans and children.  Id., table 5.
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As these figures indicate, the federal government’s involvement in health care
financing is pervasive.  In 2009, federal spending on Medicare and Medicaid was
around $750 billion, with billions more funding other federal programs.  CBO, The
Long-Term Budget Outlook, at 29-30 (2010).  These figures do not include the federal
government’s longstanding use of tax incentives to finance health care costs.  CBO,
Key Issues In Analyzing Major Health Proposals, at 30 (2008) (“Key Issues”).2
C. As a class, people who endeavor to pay for health care services
through means other than insurance shift significant costs to other
participants in the interstate health care market.
An estimated 18.8% of the non-elderly population (approximately 50 million
people) had no health insurance in 2009.  Census Bureau Report, Income, Poverty, and
Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2009, at 23, table 8.  These people
nonetheless actively participate in the interstate health care market, consuming over
$100 billion of health care services annually.  Families USA, Hidden Health Tax:
Americans Pay a Premium, at 2 (2009) ($116 billion in 2008); see also, e.g., Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”), National Center for Health Statistics,
Health, United States, 2009, at 318, table 80 (2010) (80% of those without insurance
at some point during a 12-month period visited a doctor or emergency room at least
 The federal government is also involved in other aspects of health care,2
including regulation of drugs and medical devices, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301, 351, and
communicable disease, 42 U.S.C. § 264(b) (federal quarantine statute).
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once); CDC, National Center for Health Statistics, Emergency Department Visitors
and Visits: Who Used the Emergency Room in 2007?, at 2 (2010) (20% of uninsured
adults aged 18-44 visited the emergency room in 2007); CDC, National Center for
Health Statistics, Summary Health Statistics for U.S. Children: National Health
Interview Survey, 2009, table 16 (2010) (18% of uninsured children visited the
emergency room in 2009).
People without insurance “receive treatments from traditional providers for
which they either do not pay or pay very little.”  CBO, Key Issues, at 13.  Congress
found that, in 2008, the cost of uncompensated health care for the uninsured — i.e.,
care not paid for by the patient or a third party — was $43 billion.  42 U.S.C.A.
§ 18091(a)(2)(F); see also Families USA, Hidden Health Tax, at 2, 6.  Congress
further found that health care providers pass on a significant portion of these costs “to
private insurers, which pass on the cost to families,” increasing the average premiums
for insured families by “over $1,000 a year.”  42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(F); see also
Families USA, Hidden Health Tax, at 2, 6.
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D. Before the Affordable Care Act, the percentage of people with
private health insurance steadily decreased.
In 2009, the percentage of the non-elderly with private health insurance
coverage (64.2%) was significantly lower than that in 2000 (73.4%), meaning that
millions more lacked insurance.  Holahan, The 2007-09 Recession And Health
Insurance Coverage, 30 Health Affairs 145, 148 (2011).  The percentage covered by
employment-based plans dropped from 68.3% in 2000 to 59% in 2009.  Ibid.
People who attempt to purchase health insurance in the individual insurance
market face significant obstacles.  Insurers scrutinize applicants’ medical condition
and history to determine eligibility and premiums, a process known as “medical
underwriting.”  CBO, Key Issues, at 8, 80.  A recent national survey estimated that 9
million non-elderly adults — 35% of those who tried to purchase health insurance in
the individual insurance market in the previous three years — were denied coverage,
charged a higher rate, or offered limited coverage because of a pre-existing condition. 
Help on the Horizon, Findings from the Commonwealth Fund Biennial Health
Insurance Survey of 2010, at xi (2011). 
Medical underwriting is expensive, and insurers pass on that expense through
increased premiums in the individual market.  Administrative costs for private health
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insurance, including underwriting costs, totaled $90 billion in 2006 — 26-30% of the
premiums in the individual and small group markets.  42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(J).
Given the cost of policies and restrictions on coverage, only 20% of Americans
who lack other coverage options purchase a policy in the individual market.  CBO,
Key Issues, at 9.  The remaining 80% are uninsured.  Ibid.
II.  The Affordable Care Act
The Affordable Care Act addressed problems in the national health care system
that states individually have proven unable to solve effectively.  Through
comprehensive reforms, the Act will make health care coverage widely available and
affordable, protect consumers from insurance underwriting practices, and reduce the
uncompensated care that shifts costs to other participants in the interstate health care
market and thereby increases premiums for insured consumers.  In so doing, the Act
also removes obstacles to interstate commerce such as “job lock,” the inability or
reluctance of workers to move to new jobs because of possible loss of employee health
insurance benefits.
First, the Act builds upon the existing nationwide system of employer-based
health insurance, the principal private mechanism for health care financing.  Congress
established tax incentives for small businesses to purchase health insurance for their
employees, 26 U.S.C.A. § 45R, and prescribed tax penalties for a large employer if it
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does not offer full-time employees adequate coverage and at least one full-time
employee receives a tax credit to assist with the purchase of coverage in a health
insurance exchange established under the Act.  Id. § 4980H.
Second, the Act provides for the creation of health insurance exchanges to allow
individuals, families, and small businesses to use their collective buying power to
obtain prices competitive with those of large-employer group plans.  42 U.S.C.A.
§ 18031.
Third, for individuals and families with household income between 133% and
400% of the federal poverty line who purchase insurance through an exchange,
Congress offered federal tax credits for payment of health insurance premiums.  26
U.S.C.A. § 36B(a), (b).   Congress also authorized federal payments to help cover3
out-of-pocket expenses such as co-payments or deductibles for eligible individuals
who purchase coverage through an exchange.  42 U.S.C.A. § 18071.  In addition,
Congress expanded eligibility for Medicaid to cover individuals with income below
133% of the federal poverty line.  Id. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII).
Fourth, the Act regulates insurers to protect individuals from industry practices
that have prevented people from obtaining and maintaining health insurance.  The Act
 Except in Alaska and Hawaii, the federal poverty line in 2011 is $10,890 for3
a household of one, and $22,350 for a family of four.  Department of Health and
Human Services (“HHS”) Poverty Guidelines, 76 Fed. Reg. 3637-02 (Jan. 20, 2011). 
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bars insurers from refusing coverage because of pre-existing medical conditions,
canceling insurance absent fraud or intentional misrepresentation of material fact,
charging higher premiums based on a person’s medical history, and placing lifetime
dollar caps on benefits.  Id. §§ 300gg, 300gg-1(a), 300gg-3(a), 300gg-11, 300gg-12.
Fifth, in the minimum coverage provision at issue here, the Act requires that
non-exempted individuals pay a tax penalty if they do not maintain a minimum level
of health insurance.  26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A.    The penalty does not apply to individuals4
whose household income is insufficient to require them to file a federal income tax
return, whose premium payments would exceed 8% of their household income, or who
establish that the requirement would impose a hardship.  Id. § 5000A(e).
The CBO has projected that the Act will reduce the number of non-elderly
people without insurance by about 33 million by 2019.  Letter from Douglas W.
Elmendorf to Speaker John Boehner, at 8, table 3 (Feb. 18, 2011).
 This insurance requirement may be satisfied through enrollment in an4
employer-sponsored plan; an individual market plan including one offered through
a health insurance exchange; a grandfathered health plan; certain
government-sponsored programs such as Medicare, Medicaid, or TRICARE; or
similar coverage recognized by the Secretary of HHS in coordination with the
Secretary of the Treasury.  26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(f).
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
The district court’s rulings present issues of law subject to de novo review.  
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Affordable Care Act as a whole, and the minimum coverage provision in
particular, regulate the way consumers pay for health care services in the interstate
health care market.  The Act reflects the considered effort of the elected Branches of
government to stem a crisis in the health care market.
I. A. The minimum coverage provision is a quintessential exercise of the
commerce power, which allows Congress to regulate not only interstate commerce but
also conduct that substantially affects interstate commerce.  As Congress found, the
minimum coverage provision regulates economic activity — how participants in the
national health care market pay for their services — that substantially affects interstate
commerce.  The regulation furthers two principal economic goals.  First, it prevents
people from shifting the costs of their care to other participants in the health care
market.  Second, it is key to the viability of the Act’s provisions that bar insurers from
denying coverage or setting premiums based on medical condition or history.
Fundamental features of the health care market are undisputed.  Health care
providers, suppliers, and insurers operate interstate.  Virtually all Americans
participate in the health care market.  The need for expensive services is unpredictable
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and can easily exceed the consumer’s ability to pay.  And people are legally entitled
to receive costly medical treatment in times of need even if they cannot pay.  Congress
found that people who endeavor to pay for health care without insurance often fail,
and, as a class, do not cover tens of billions of dollars of costs each year.
The federal government, along with state governments, shoulders some of these
costs.  Health care providers pass much of the remainder on to private insurers, which
pass it on to their customers.  Rising premiums contribute in turn to the decline in the
population covered by private insurance.  Completing the cycle, the growing number
of people without insurance further inflates premiums for others.
The Affordable Care Act breaks this cycle by requiring participants in the health
care market to maintain a minimum level of insurance to meet their health care costs. 
The Act also restricts the underwriting practices that have deprived many Americans
of affordable insurance because of pre-existing medical conditions.  The Act thus
makes people legally insurable regardless of illness or injury and offers protection
from higher premiums based on medical condition or history.  The experience of state
insurance regulators demonstrated that this system of guaranteed issue and community
rating would be unworkable without a minimum coverage provision that prevents
health care consumers from delaying their purchase of insurance until their medical
costs outstrip their premiums.
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In sum, the minimum coverage provision falls within Congress’s commerce
power because the provision is a rational means of regulating the way participants in
the health care market pay for their services, of preventing consumers from shifting
costs to other market participants, and of effectuating the Act’s regulatory
requirements of guaranteed issue and community rating.  Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S.
1, 16-17, 22 (2005).
B.  The Supreme Court has long stressed the deference due to Congress’s choice
of means to accomplish legitimate regulatory objectives.  That deference reflects the
constitutional authority and institutional capacity of the political Branches to make
such operational choices.  Congress’s power extends to regulation of even
“noneconomic local activity” otherwise beyond the reach of the commerce power —
“[t]he relevant question is simply whether the means chosen are ‘reasonably adapted’
to the attainment of a legitimate end under the commerce power.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at
37 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted).  That standard echoes the
principles set forth in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819): “Let the end
be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but
consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”
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The end that Congress addressed in the minimum coverage provision is
undoubtedly a proper regulatory objective under the Commerce Clause.  Consumption
of health care services without insurance has demonstrable and harmful effects on
other participants in the interstate health care market — what economists call
“externalities.”  And the means that Congress selected are specifically adapted to the
unique conditions of the health care market: participation is essentially universal; the
need for medical treatment may arise unexpectedly; the cost of care may overwhelm
the typical family budget; and individuals are legally entitled to expensive medical
services in times of need without regard to their ability to pay.  
The district court impermissibly substituted its own judgment for that of the
elected Branches in declaring that an insurance requirement cannot be imposed until
people actually seek medical care. RE 2052.  Common sense, experience, and
economic analysis confirm the testimony to Congress that a “health insurance market
could never survive or even form if people could buy their insurance on the way to the
hospital.”  47 Million and Counting: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 110th
Cong. 52 (2008) (Prof. Hall).  Moreover, it is clearly “proper” for Congress to take
into account the societal judgment — reflected in state law as well as the federal
Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (“EMTALA”) — that it would be
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unconscionable to adopt an approach that would deny medical care in an emergency
because of a person’s inability to pay.
C.   The district court held that the constitutionality of the minimum coverage
provision “turn[s] on whether the failure to buy health insurance is ‘activity,’”
RE 2045, and declared that “the mere status of being without health insurance, in and
of itself, has absolutely no impact whatsoever on interstate commerce,” RE 2051.  This
reasoning disregards the teachings of the Supreme Court, which has long rejected
“formalistic” distinctions between categories of economic conduct in favor of “broad
principles of economic practicality.”  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 569, 571
(1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
People without insurance are not “inactive”; they actively participate in the
market for health care services.  Health insurance is not acquired for its own sake; it
is obtained as a means to pay for health care services.  Contrary to the district court’s
assumption, Congress was not required to cordon off one aspect of the conduct of
participants in the health care market.  It can regulate the conduct of participants in the
overall health care market even if they are currently “inactive” in the insurance aspect
of that market.  The minimum coverage provision regulates how those participants pay
for services in the health care market, activity that is “commercial and economic in
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nature” and a subject of interstate commerce.  42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(A).  The
provision thus falls well within Congress’s broad commerce power. 
II.  The minimum coverage provision is also independently authorized under
Congress’s taxing power.  The provision amends the Internal Revenue Code to
provide that a non-exempted individual who fails to maintain a minimum level of
health insurance will pay a penalty.  The amount is calculated as a percentage of
household income, above a flat dollar amount and subject to a cap.  Like the federal
income tax, it is reported on the individual’s tax return for the taxable year.  Those
who file jointly are jointly liable for the payment, and are responsible for dependents,
as defined in the Internal Revenue Code.   And this tax penalty is assessed and
collected in the same general manner as certain other federal tax penalties.  The
provision thus operates as a tax, and it is projected to raise billions of dollars in
revenue each year.
Contrary to the district court’s reasoning, the validity of this provision does not
turn on whether it is labeled a “tax.”  The Affordable Care Act uses terms like “tax”
and “assessable payment” interchangeably, and the Constitution itself uses various
terms to describe the power of taxation.  In “passing on the constitutionality of a tax
law,” a court is “concerned only with its practical operation, not its definition or the
precise form of descriptive words which may be applied to it.”  Nelson v. Sears,
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Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 363 (1941).  This rule reflects principles of judicial
restraint, which require that courts determine whether any provision of the
Constitution authorized Congress to act, not whether Congress, in acting, formally
invoked a particular grant of authority.
III.  Even assuming arguendo that the minimum coverage provision was not a
valid exercise of Congress’s Article I powers, the district court overstepped its
authority by declaring the Affordable Care Act invalid in its entirety and including
parties without standing within the scope of its judgment.
A.  The district court observed that the Affordable Care Act “has approximately
450 separate pieces,” RE 2074, and recognized that many of these provisions,
including “many [that] are already in effect and functioning,” can “stand alone and
function independently” of the minimum coverage provision, RE 2066-67.  Indeed,
many provisions, such as those amending the False Claims Act, have no relationship
whatsoever to the minimum coverage provision.  Others re-authorized longstanding
programs.  The court nevertheless declared that the Act’s provisions “are all
inextricably bound together in purpose and must stand or fall as a single unit.”
RE 2075.  Nothing in the Act, committee reports, hearings, or floor debate remotely
suggests such an all-encompassing bond.  Because “[a] ruling of unconstitutionality
frustrates the intent of the elected representatives of the people,” the Supreme Court
22
has repeatedly held that a court must “refrain from invalidating more of the statute
than is necessary.”  Regan v. Time, Inc.,  468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984).  The district
court’s departure from this governing precedent cannot be sustained.
B.  The court likewise disregarded basic principles of standing.  Although the
minimum coverage provision will place obligations only on individuals, the court held
that two plaintiff states — Idaho and Utah — have standing to challenge that provision
because they had enacted statutes purporting to nullify the operation of the provision
with respect to their residents.  RE 2017-18.  That ruling is foreclosed by Supreme
Court precedent establishing that a state lacks standing “to protect her citizens from
the operation of federal statutes.”  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 n.17
(2007).  That Idaho and Utah have framed their disagreement with federal law in state
statutes as well as a judicial complaint does not avoid that longstanding bar.  Their
claims impermissibly call upon the Court “to adjudicate, not rights of person or
property, not rights of dominion over physical domain, not quasi sovereign rights
actually invaded or threatened, but abstract questions of political power, of
sovereignty, of government.”  Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 484-85 (1923). 
Having wrongly held that two plaintiff states had standing, the district court explicitly
declined to consider the standing of the remaining plaintiff states.  RE 2019. 
Nonetheless, in a further departure from the limits on judicial power, the court
23
included all 26 plaintiff states within the scope of a judgment it regarded as the
practical equivalent of an injunction.
ARGUMENT
I. The Minimum Coverage Provision Is a Valid Exercise of Congress’s
Commerce Power.
The Constitution grants Congress power to “regulate Commerce ... among the
several States,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and to “make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper” to the execution of that power, id. cl. 18.  These grants of
authority allow Congress not only to regulate interstate commerce but also to address
other conduct that “substantially affect[s] interstate commerce.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at
16-17.  In assessing such substantial effects, Congress’s focus is necessarily broad. 
Congress may consider the aggregate effect of a particular form of conduct, and need
not predict case by case whether and to what extent particular individuals in the class
will contribute to those aggregate effects.  Id. at 22; United States v. Maxwell, 446
F.3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Maxwell II”).
In reviewing the validity of Commerce Clause legislation, a court’s task “is a
modest one.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 22.  The court “need not determine” whether the
regulated conduct, “taken in the aggregate, substantially affect[s] interstate commerce
in fact, but only whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.”  Ibid.  A court is
similarly deferential in reviewing the means Congress chose to achieve legitimate
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ends.  “[T]he Constitution’s grants of specific federal legislative authority are
accompanied by broad power to enact laws that are ‘convenient, or useful’ or
‘conducive’ to the authority’s ‘beneficial exercise.’”  United States v. Comstock, 130
S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010) (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 413, 418).  “Not only may
Congress regulate ‘non-commercial’ activity pursuant to its ‘Commerce’ Clause
authority, but courts have only a limited role in second-guessing whether a ‘class of
[non-commercial] activity ... undercut[s]’ Congress’s unquestioned authority to
regulate the broader interstate market.”  Maxwell II, 446 F.3d at 1215 (quoting Raich,
545 U.S. at 18).  This deference reflects separation-of-powers principles and
Congress’s superior capacity to make empirical and operational judgments.  It “has
special significance in cases, like this one, involving congressional judgments
concerning regulatory schemes of inherent complexity.”  Turner Broadcasting System,
Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 196 (1997).
A. The minimum coverage provision regulates the way people pay for
health care services, a class of economic activity that substantially
affects interstate commerce. 
Congress’s findings and the legislative record leave no doubt that the minimum
coverage provision — which regulates the way people pay for services in the interstate
health care market — is a valid exercise of the commerce power under the standards
established by the Supreme Court.  It “regulates activity that is commercial and
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economic in nature,” 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(A), and that substantially affects
interstate commerce.  First, Congress found that people who consume health care
without insurance shift billions of dollars of costs annually to other participants in the
interstate health care market.  Id. § 18091(a)(2)(F).  Second, Congress found that the
minimum coverage provision is key to the viability of the Act’s regulation of medical
underwriting, which guarantees that everyone will be insurable regardless of illnesses
or accidents.  Id. § 18091(a)(2)(I), (J).
1. The minimum coverage provision regulates the practice of
obtaining health care services without insurance, a practice
that shifts substantial costs to other participants in the health
care market.
The interstate nature of the market for health care services is undisputed.  Nor
is it controverted that individuals participate in the market for health care services
whether or not they have health insurance.  See pp. 10-11, supra.  The uninsured do
not, however, bear the full cost of their participation.  A 2005 study found that, even
in households at or above median income, uninsured people on average pay less than
half the cost of the medical care they consume.  Herring, The Effect of the Availability
of Charity Care to the Uninsured on the Demand for Private Health Insurance, 24 J.
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Health Econ. 225, 229-31 (2005).  Moreover, they pay a diminishing percentage of
their costs as their consumption of medical services increases.  Ibid.5
Congressional findings quantified this impact on interstate commerce: “The cost
of providing uncompensated care to the uninsured was $43,000,000,000 in 2008.”  42
U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(F).  Congress also made findings about how these costs affect
the interstate health care market — costs are passed on from providers “to private
insurers, which pass on the cost to families.”  Ibid.
Congress determined that this cost-shifting inflates family health insurance
premiums “by on average over $1,000 a year.”  Ibid.; see also 156 Cong. Rec. E506-
01, 2010 WL 1133757 (Mar. 25, 2010) (Rep. Waxman).  In California, for example,
uncompensated care for the uninsured accounts for an estimated 10% of premiums. 
S. Rep. No. 111-89, at 2 (2009).
Supreme Court precedents make clear that Congress need not show that every
uninsured person, or which uninsured persons, will receive uncompensated care and
shift costs.  Raich, 545 U.S. at 18-19; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127 (1942). 
Millions do so each year, and the cumulative impact of such cost-shifting is a multi-
billion dollar annual burden on interstate commerce, which easily qualifies as
 In households at or above the median income, uninsured people who consume5
over $10,000 in medical services pay only 22% of their costs.  Herring, at 230.
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“substantial.”  Where “Congress decides that the ‘total incidence’ of a practice” —
here, the practice of consuming health care services without insurance — “poses a
threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire class.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 17
(quoting Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154-155 (1971)). 
2. The minimum coverage provision is essential to the Act’s
guaranteed-issue and community-rating insurance reforms.
   
The minimum coverage provision is also valid Commerce Clause legislation
because it is integral to broader economic regulation — the requirement that insurers
extend coverage and set premiums without regard to pre-existing medical conditions. 
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944) (insurance
business is interstate commerce within the meaning of the Commerce Clause).
Learning from state regulators, Congress understood that these guaranteed-issue
and community-rating requirements would be unsustainable if participants in the
health care market could postpone purchasing insurance until an acute need arose. 
Congress accordingly concluded that the absence of a minimum coverage requirement
“would leave a gaping hole” in that regulatory scheme.  Raich, 545 U.S. at 22.  Thus,
even if the way people pay for health care services were not regarded as economic
activity, regulation would nevertheless be proper because Congress found that the
“failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate
market.”  Id. at 18; see also id. at 37-38 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).  As
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this Court stressed in upholding the federal ban on possession of child pornography,
“where Congress comprehensively regulates economic activity, it may constitutionally
regulate intrastate activity, whether economic or not, so long as the inability to do so
would undermine Congress’s ability to implement effectively the overlying economic
regulatory scheme.”  Maxwell II, 446 F.3d at 1215 (footnote omitted); accord United
States v. Smith, 459 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir. 2006).
The Nation has faced a serious shortage of affordable health insurance.  More
than 50 million Americans went without insurance in 2009. Census Bureau Report,
Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2009, at 23,
table 8.  Rising premiums have priced many out of the market.  Between 1999 and
2010, for example, average premiums for employer-sponsored family coverage
increased 138 percent.  Kaiser Family Foundation Employer Health Benefits, 2010
Annual Survey, at 31, table 1.11 (2010).6
Many others are excluded from coverage by “medical underwriting,” a process
by which insurers establish eligibility and premiums based on individual health status
or history.  About 35% of non-elderly adult applicants in the individual market are
 The number without insurance has increased dramatically since 1970, when6
only 6% of Americans under age sixty-five had no coverage.  Hermer, The
Scapegoat: EMTALA and Emergency Department Overcrowding, 14 J. Law & Policy
695, 710 (2006).
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denied coverage, charged a higher premium, or offered limited coverage because of
pre-existing conditions.  Help on the Horizon, at xi.  Depending on the definition used,
between 50 and 129 million non-elderly Americans (19 to 50% of the non-elderly
population) have at least one pre-existing condition, and the four largest for-profit
insurers excluded more than 600,000 individuals from coverage because of such
conditions in the three years before the Affordable Care Act.  HHS, At Risk:
Pre-Existing Conditions Could Affect 1 in 2 Americans (2011); Chairman Henry A.
Waxman and Rep. Bart Stupak, Memorandum on Coverage Denials for Pre-Existing
Conditions in the Individual Health Insurance Market to H. Comm. on Energy &
Commerce, at 1 (Oct. 12, 2010).
Insurers often deny coverage even for minor pre-existing conditions, including
“conditions as common as asthma, ear infections, and high blood pressure.”  47
Million and Counting, 110th Cong. 52 (Hall).  “The four largest for-profit health
insurance companies ... have each listed pregnancy as a medical condition that would
result in an automatic denial of individual health insurance coverage.”  Chairman
Waxman and Rep. Stupak, Memorandum on Maternity Coverage in the Individual
Health Insurance Market to H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, at 1 (Oct. 12, 2010).
The Act’s guaranteed-issue and community-rating requirements end these
restrictive underwriting practices.  Congress found that these requirements would not
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work without a minimum coverage provision to prevent health care consumers from
waiting to buy insurance until they are injured or sick.  42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(I).
Congress thus found the provision “essential to creating effective health insurance
markets in which improved health insurance products that are guaranteed issue and do
not exclude coverage of pre-existing conditions can be sold.”  Id. § 18091(a)(2)(I).
The legislative record demonstrated that the absence of a minimum coverage
requirement linked to guaranteed-issue and community-rating requirements had
undermined health care reform efforts in several states.  For example, citing New
Jersey’s experience, Princeton University Professor Uwe Reinhardt explained that “[i]t
is well known that community-rating and guaranteed issue, coupled with voluntary
insurance, tends to lead to a death spiral of individual insurance.”  Making Health
Care Work for American Families, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy &
Commerce, Subcomm. on Health, 111th Cong. 11 (Mar. 17, 2009).  In the wake of
similar legislation in New York, “[t]here was a dramatic exodus of indemnity insurers
from New York’s individual market.”  Hall, An Evaluation of New York’s Reform
Law, 25 J. Health Politics, Pol’y & Law 71, 91-92 (2000).  And, when Maine enacted
similar legislation, most insurers withdrew from the state.  Health Reform in the 21st
Century: Insurance Market Reforms: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways &
Means, 111th Cong. 117 (2009) (Phil Caper, M.D., and Joe Lendvai).  In contrast,
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Congress found that Massachusetts avoided these perils by enacting a minimum
coverage requirement as part of broader insurance reforms.  That requirement “has
strengthened private employer-based coverage: despite the economic downturn, the
number of workers offered employer-based coverage has actually increased.”  42
U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(D).
The Affordable Care Act makes everyone insurable and provides protection
against ruinous medical expenses.  Id. § 18091(a)(2)(G) (62% of personal
bankruptcies are caused in part by medical expenses).  “The uninsured ... benefit from
the ‘guaranteed issue’ provision in the Act, which enables them to become insured
even when they are already sick.”  Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d
882, 894 (E.D. Mich. 2010).  Even apart from the other rational bases for Congress’s
action, “[t]his benefit makes imposing the minimum coverage provision appropriate.” 
Ibid. 
B. The minimum coverage provision is a necessary and proper means
of regulating interstate commerce. 
1. The provision is plainly adapted to the unique conditions of the
health care market.
The district court did not dispute that consumption of health care services
without insurance imposes a substantial burden on the interstate health care market.
RE 2046, 2051-52.  Nor did it question the centrality of the minimum coverage
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provision to the Act’s broader regulation of medical underwriting.  RE 2057-58. 
Instead, the court took issue with the means that Congress chose to regulate payment
for services in the interstate health care market.  While recognizing that “Congress
plainly has the power” to regulate the way people pay for health care services — a
point plaintiffs conceded, RE 334-35— the court held that Congress may do so only
“at the time that they initially seek medical care,” RE 2052, and cannot require
“advance purchase of health insurance based on a future contingency that will
substantially affect commerce,” RE 2049.
Governing precedent does not permit a court to override Congress’s judgment
about the appropriate means to achieve objectives within the scope of the commerce
power.  The federal government is “‘one of enumerated powers,’” but, “at the same
time, ‘a government, entrusted with such’ powers ‘must also be entrusted with ample
means for their execution.’”  Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956 (quoting McCulloch, 17
U.S. at 405, 408).  Where “Congress has the authority to enact a regulation of
interstate commerce, ‘it possesses every power needed to make that regulation
effective.’”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 36 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting
United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 118-19 (1942)).  
Accordingly, “the relevant inquiry” under the Necessary and Proper Clause “is
simply ‘whether the means chosen are “reasonably adapted” to the attainment of a
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legitimate end under the commerce power’ or under other powers that the Constitution
grants Congress the authority to implement.”  Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1957 (quoting
Raich, 545 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting United States
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 121 (1941)).  In determining whether a statute is “reasonably
adapted” to a legitimate goal, a court looks “to see whether the statute constitutes a
means that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated
power.”  United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 804 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956).  
The means chosen by Congress to effectuate the Affordable Care Act’s
regulatory goals are tailored to the unique conditions of the interstate health care
market: participation is essentially universal; the need for medical treatment may arise
unexpectedly and not as a matter of choice; the cost of care may overwhelm the typical
family budget; and, in times of need, individuals are entitled to obtain expensive
medical services without regard to their ability to pay.  The minimum coverage
requirement ensures that non-exempted individuals who can afford insurance will pay
for the services they consume, rather than shift their costs to others.
It is hardly novel for the government to require the purchase of insurance to
prevent the externalization of costs.  In the case of vehicle insurance, the requirement
accompanies registration of an automobile.  The risks addressed by health insurance,
34
however, are always present and are not linked to a particular circumstance such as car
ownership.  The need for medical care is a “future contingency,” RE 2049, only in the
sense that the timing and extent of individual need cannot accurately be predicted.
Moreover, our society has long recognized that it would be unconscionable to
deny medical care to someone in an emergency because of the economic choices he
or she has made.  Florida law, for example, declares it “of vital importance that
emergency services and care be provided by hospitals and physicians to every person
in need of such care.”  Fla. Stat. Ann. § 395.1041(1), (3).  Texas law likewise provides
that “a general hospital may not deny emergency services because a person cannot
establish the person’s ability to pay for the services.”  Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann.
§ 311.022(a), (b); see also, e.g., South Carolina Code Ann. § 44-7-260(E); La. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 40:2113.4; Idaho Code Ann. § 39-1391b.  Even before enactment of
EMTALA in 1986, “at least 22 states [had] enacted statutes or issued regulations
requiring the provision of limited medical services whenever an emergency situation
exists,”  in addition to “state court rulings impos[ing] a common law duty on doctors
and hospitals to provide necessary emergency care.”  H.R. Rep. No. 99-241(III)
(1985), at 5, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 726, 727.
Finding these measures inadequate to prevent “hospital emergency rooms [from]
refusing to accept or treat patients with emergency conditions if the patient does not
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have medical insurance,” H.R. Rep. No. 99-241(I), at 27, Congress augmented state
law through EMTALA in 1986.  The federal statute requires all hospitals that
participate in Medicare and offer emergency services to stabilize any patient who
arrives with an emergency condition, without regard to ability to pay.  42 U.S.C.
§ 1395dd; see also Roberts v. Galen of Virginia, Inc., 525 U.S. 249 (1999); Harry v.
Marchant, 291 F.3d 767, 772-73 (11th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
The minimum coverage provision is plainly adapted to these practical and moral
imperatives of the health care system.  Although the district court held that a health
insurance requirement cannot be imposed until medical care is actually needed, a
“health insurance market could never survive or even form if people could buy their
insurance on the way to the hospital.”  47 Million and Counting, 110th Cong. 52
(Hall).  Moreover, it is clearly “proper” for Congress to take into account the societal
judgment — reflected in state and federal law — that denying emergency care because
the patient lacks insurance would be unconscionable.  Cf. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at
1961 (noting the “common law” duty not to release dangerous persons in one’s
custody, in finding it “necessary and proper” for Congress to confine a federal prisoner
whose mental illness threatens others).
The district court saw no difference between a requirement to maintain
insurance to pay for health care costs and a requirement to “buy a General Motors
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automobile.”  RE 2047.  But the difference is evident.  The automotive analogy would
require a fictional world in which (1) every individual is necessarily in the car market
because he may develop a sudden, unforeseen need for a car, and (2) is entitled to
receive the car regardless of his ability to pay.  Even then, a parallel statute would not
require the purchase of a car but rather the purchase of a financial instrument to
finance the purchase of a car.
The Heritage Foundation stressed these distinctions decades ago in urging that
the government “[m]andate all households to obtain adequate insurance.”  The
Heritage Foundation explained: “If a young man wrecks his Porsche and has not had
the foresight to obtain insurance, we may commiserate but society feels no obligation
to repair his car.”  But, it observed, “health care is different.  If a man is struck down
by a heart attack in the street, Americans will care for him whether or not he has
insurance.  If we find that he has spent money on other things rather than insurance,
we may be angry but we will not deny him services — even if that means more
prudent citizens end up paying the tab.”  Stuart M. Butler, The Heritage Lectures 218:
Assuring Affordable Health Care for All Americans, at 6 (Heritage Foundation 1989).
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2. Congress can regulate participants in the health care
market even if they are not currently “active” in the
insurance market. 
a.   The district court opined  that the constitutionality of the minimum coverage
provision “turn[s] on whether the failure to buy insurance is ‘activity,’” RE 2045, and
declared that “the mere status of being without health insurance, in and of itself, has
absolutely no impact whatsoever on interstate commerce,” RE 2051.  This mode of
analysis disregards the teachings of the Supreme Court, which has rejected
“formalistic” distinctions between categories of economic conduct and “committed
itself to sustaining federal legislation on broad principles of economic practicality.” 
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 569, 571 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
People without insurance are not “inactive”; they actively participate in the
market for health care services.  Indeed, millions of the uninsured participate by
obtaining health care for which they cannot pay.  The minimum coverage provision
regulates how participants pay for services in the health care market — activity that
is itself “commercial and economic in nature” and a subject of interstate commerce. 
42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(A).  Congress may regulate the conduct of participants in
the health care market even if those individuals are, at a particular point in time,
“inactive” in the insurance market.
38
The district court treated the minimum coverage requirement as if it were an end
in itself that functioned only in the insurance market.  Congress, however, viewed the
requirement as a means of regulating payment for services in the health care market. 
That congressional judgment was not merely reasonable.  It was correct.  Health
insurance is not bought for its own sake; it is bought to pay for medical expenses. 
Porat, et al., Market Insurance Versus Self Insurance, 58 J. Risk & Ins. 657, 668
(1991); Martin Feldstein, The Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance, 81 J. Pol.
Econ. 251, 253 (1973) (“Health insurance is purchased not as a final consumption
good but as a means of paying for the future stochastic purchases of health services.”).
Those who resort to other options to pay medical expenses may attempt to “use
informal risk-sharing arrangements, diversify assets, draw down savings, sell assets,
borrow, or go into debt to cover needed services.”  Ruger, at 55; see also Pauly, Risks
and Benefits in Health Care: The View From Economics, 26 Health Affairs 653, 658
(2007).  “Regardless of whether one relies on an insurance policy, one’s savings, or
the backstop of free or reduced-cost emergency room services, one has made a choice
regarding the method of payment for the health care services one expects to receive.” 
Liberty University Inc. v. Geithner, __ F. Supp. 2d __ (W.D. Va. 2010), 2010 WL
4860299, *15.  Some individuals may prefer to pay for health care services out of
pocket rather than through insurance.  But such economic preferences are plainly
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subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause.  These individuals actively
participate in the market for health care services and impose “a substantial impact on
the national market for health care by collectively shifting billions of dollars on to
other market participants and driving up the prices of insurance policies.”  Ibid.;
accord Thomas More, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 894; Mead v. Holder, __ F. Supp. 2d __
(D.D.C. 2011), 2011 WL 611139, *18.
The district court’s holding that the exercise of the commerce power must await
specific commercial transactions, RE 2052, disregards the role of health insurance as
the means to pay for health care services and the practical and ethical considerations
that are unique to the health care market.  By the time people “seek medical care,”
RE 2052, it is too late to require that they have insurance to pay its costs.  The district
court did not suggest that people should be denied emergency treatment if they lack
insurance to pay for it — a morally repugnant approach that would be at odds with the
laws of plaintiff states as well as federal law.  The court did not dispute that millions
each year fail to pay for the health care services that they consume, nor did it dispute
that where, as here, “Congress decides that the ‘total incidence’ of a practice poses a
threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire class.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 17
(citation omitted).
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The court’s ruling that the exercise of the commerce power nonetheless must
be linked to specific market transactions echoes arguments repeatedly rejected by the
Supreme Court.  In Raich, the Court upheld the application of the Controlled
Substances Act to the possession of marijuana grown at home for personal use.  The
Court found it irrelevant that the individuals were not engaged in commerce and did
not buy, sell, or distribute any portion of the marijuana they possessed.  The regulation
was proper under the Commerce Clause because “Congress had a rational basis for
concluding that leaving home-consumed marijuana outside federal control would ...
affect price and market conditions.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 19.
Raich reflected principles established more than half a century earlier in
Wickard v. Filburn, which upheld the federal regulation of wheat that was neither
“sold or intended to be sold.”  317 U.S. 119.  The Court held that exercise of the
commerce power was an appropriate means to control the volume and price of wheat
in the interstate market, even though the home consumption of wheat by any
individual “may be trivial by itself,” id. at 127, and even though the regulation
“forc[ed] some farmers into the market to buy what they could provide for
themselves,” id. at 129.  
This Court in Maxwell II recognized that its earlier invalidation of the federal
ban on possession of child pornography could not be reconciled with Raich.  In its
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initial decision, this Court had concluded that the prohibition had “no clear economic
purpose,” made “no effort to control national trade by regulating intrastate activity,”
and, instead, “attempt[ed] to regulate primary conduct directly, even within state
borders.”  United States v. Maxwell, 386 F.3d 1042, 1057 (11th Cir. 2004)
(“Maxwell I”).  After the Supreme Court vacated this decision in light of Raich, this
Court held that the prohibition was a “valid exercise of Congress’s authority pursuant
to the Necessary and Proper Clause to effectuate Congress’s power to regulate
commerce among the several states.”  Maxwell II, 446 F.3d at 1219.  This Court
explained that “where Congress has attempted to regulate (or eliminate) an interstate
market, Raich grants Congress substantial leeway to regulate purely intrastate activity
(whether economic or not) that it deems to have the capability, in the aggregate, of
frustrating the broader regulation of interstate economic activity.”  Id.  at 1215; see
also Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coal. v. Kempthorne, 477 F.3d 1250, 1271, 1277
(11th Cir. 2007) (upholding the listing of the Alabama sturgeon under the Endangered
Species Act although “there have been no reported commercial harvests of the fish in
more than a century,” because Congress could have reasonably determined “that the
most effective way to safeguard the commercial benefits of biodiversity was to protect
all endangered species, regardless of their geographic range”).
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b.  The district court thus erred in analyzing the minimum coverage provision
through the lens of “inactivity,” rather than applying the “broad principles of economic
practicality” that underlie modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  Lopez, 514 U.S.
at 571 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Even assuming arguendo that the minimum
coverage provision could be thought to regulate inactivity, Congress is not regulating
inactivity “as such,” Raich, 545 U.S. at 38 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment), but
as an aspect of its regulation of active participation in the health care market.
The Supreme Court has long held that “questions of the power of Congress are
not to be decided by reference to any formula” without regard to “the actual effects of
the activity in question upon interstate commerce.”  Wickard, 317 U.S. at 120; see also
Darby, 312 U.S. at 118, 124 (referring to “practica[l] impossib[ility]” of targeting only
interstate shipments and employers and holding that Congress may “resort to all means
for the exercise of a granted power which are appropriate and plainly adapted to the
permitted end”); Swift Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398 (1905) (“[C]ommerce
among the States is not a technical legal conception, but a practical one, drawn from
the course of business.”); cf. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336-37
(1962) (Congress in the Clayton Act “prescribed a pragmatic, factual approach to the
definition of the relevant market”).
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Federal statutes address practical economic consequences, and need not be
triggered by specific market transactions.  For example, the Endangered Species Act
protects even “a purely intrastate species with little, if any, commercial value.” 
Alabama-Tombigbee,  477 F.3d at 1271.  The Federal Access to Clinic Entrances Act
prohibits physical obstruction of reproductive health clinics.  Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d
1517, 1519-21 & n.6 (11th Cir. 1995) (finding “no authority ... for the proposition that
Congress’ Commerce Clause authority extends only to the regulation of commercial
actors”).  Federal child pornography laws bar individual possession of child
pornography even where “the record contained no evidence to indicate that [the]
individual conduct was likely to impact interstate commerce.”  Maxwell II, 446 F.3d
at 1217-18.  Indeed, such laws are triggered even when an individual comes into
possession of child pornography innocently, without having taken active measures.
Such an individual is required to take reasonable steps to destroy the depictions or
report the matter to law enforcement officials.  18 U.S.C. § 2252(c).  See also Second
Militia Act of 1792, ch. 33, § 1, 1 Stat. 271 (requiring all free men to obtain firearms,
ammunition, and other equipment); Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317, 328 (1935)
(sustaining requirement that persons holding gold bullion, coin, or certificates
exchange them for paper currency).
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3. The minimum coverage provision regulates economic activity
as part of a broad regulation of interstate commerce, and
bears no resemblance to the statutes in Lopez and Morrison.
The district court attempted to derive support for its holding from Lopez and
Morrison, the only modern cases to invalidate statutes as beyond the reach of the
commerce power.  But, as this Court has explained, in Lopez and Morrison, the Court
addressed “a single-subject statute whose single subject is itself non-economic
(e.g., possession of a gun in a school zone or gender-motivated violence).” 
Maxwell II,  446 F.3d at 1217 n.6.  In Lopez, the Court struck down a ban on
possession of handguns in school zones because the ban was related to economic
activity only insofar as the presence of guns near schools might impair learning, which
in turn might ultimately undermine economic productivity.  Similarly, in Morrison, the
Court invalidated a tort cause of action established by the Violence Against Women
Act, explaining that it would require a chain of speculative assumptions to connect
gender-motivated violence with interstate commerce.  Neither measure played any role
in broader regulation of economic activity, and the “noneconomic, criminal nature of
the conduct at issue was central” to the decisions.  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610; accord
Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 607 (2004).
The minimum coverage provision, in contrast, concerns intrinsically economic
activity by requiring that individuals maintain health insurance as a means to pay for
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services in the health care market.  It is part of a broad economic regulation of health
care financing in the massive interstate health care market, and it is essential to the
Act’s regulation of underwriting practices in the insurance industry.  It is difficult to
conceive of statutory provisions more clearly economic than the ones here, which
regulate the means of payment for health care services and impose requirements on
insurers, employers, and individuals made insurable by the Act.  Far from the chain
of attenuated reasoning that was required in Lopez and Morrison to identify a
substantial effect on interstate commerce, the link to interstate commerce here is direct
and compelling.
The district court also overlooked the concern that animated the reasoning in
Lopez and Morrison, which was to avoid a view of economic causation so broad that
it would “obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local in the
activities of commerce.”  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616 n.6 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at
567).  The district court did not suggest that the Affordable Care Act intrudes into an
area of regulation reserved to the states, or that the 50 states, acting independently,
could effectively solve the problems besetting our national health care system.
The modern health care system is interdependent and operates across state
boundaries.  Most health insurance is sold by national or regional companies that
operate interstate and that are characterized by “[i]nterrelationship, interdependence,
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and integration of activities in all the states in which they operate.”  South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. at 541.  Insurance covers costs for medical supplies
shipped in interstate commerce.  42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(B).  Providers and
insurers are joined in national networks, and consumers cross state lines to obtain
health care services.  “Hospitals are regularly engaged in interstate commerce,
performing services for out-of-state patients and generating revenues from out-of-state
sources.”  Freilich v. Upper Chesapeake Health, Inc., 313 F.3d 205, 213 (4th Cir.
2002); see also Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1520 (“there is an interstate market with respect to
both patients and doctors”).
The interstate nature of the health care system has been amplified by modern
transportation, which expanded the scope of commerce subject to federal regulation. 
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 251 (1964).  Given the ease of
travel, illnesses can spread rapidly and individuals can suddenly need health care
services far from home.   Consumers also travel to obtain services not readily available7
in their own state.  For example, residents of southwestern Pennsylvania make more
than 1500 emergency room visits each year to a teaching hospital in West Virginia. 
 Interstate mobility itself facilitates the spread of disease, as Congress7
understood.  H.R. Rep. No. 111-299(I), at 744 (2009).
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RE 1579 (noting also that a medical center in Seattle is the only Level 1 trauma center
for the four-state region of Washington, Alaska, Montana, and Idaho).
Regulation of health care and health insurance also implicates mobility between
jobs and among states, considerations absent in Lopez and Morrison.  Health insurance
is often an element of employee compensation, and if employees put their insurance
at risk if they change jobs, they may be “reluctant to switch jobs in the first place (a
phenomenon known as ‘job lock’).”  CBO, Key Issues, at 8.  Thus, the prospect of
losing employee health insurance may create obstructions to interstate mobility, which
the Constitution generally, and the commerce power specifically, were designed to
prevent.  Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 253 (noting that “uncertainty stemming from
racial discrimination had the effect of discouraging travel”).
Before the Affordable Care Act, this mobility created potential disincentives for
individual states to adopt comprehensive reforms of their health care and health
insurance markets.   A state might reasonably have resisted providing more generous8
benefits or broader coverage than its neighboring states out of concern that it would
become “a bait to the needy and dependent elsewhere, encouraging them to migrate
 See 156 Cong. Rec. H1824, H1835 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2010) (Rep.8
McGovern) (in light of the Affordable Care Act, Massachusetts “will no longer be
forced to subsidize through higher premiums and higher Medicare and Medicaid costs
the uncompensated care of people in other States who do not have health insurance”). 
48
and seek a haven of repose.”  Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 644 (1937). 
Moreover, as the experience of state insurance regulators showed, see pp. 31-32,
supra, a state considering reform of restrictive insurance practices might have worried
that insurers — mostly regional or national companies, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(B)
— would respond to such regulation “simply by pulling up stakes” (particularly if the
state reforms lacked a minimum coverage provision).  Rosenbaum, Can States Pick
Up the Health Reform Torch?, 362 New England J. Med. e29(1), e29(3) (2010). 
“Affordable health care is a national problem that demands a national solution.”  Ibid. 
This contrasts sharply with Lopez and Morrison, which involved traditional subjects
of state criminal law enforcement focused on local actors.
Given these realities, it was eminently rational for Congress to address the
challenges of a state-driven approach to health care by enacting national reforms.  See
Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 282 (1981)
(Congress acted within its “traditional role ... under the Commerce Clause” in finding
that national coal mining standards were necessary because states might limit
conservation efforts in response to interstate competition among coal sellers); Darby,
312 U.S. at 122-23; Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
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II.  The Minimum Coverage Provision Is Also Independently Authorized by
Congress’s Taxing Power. 
The minimum coverage provision is also independently authorized by
Congress’s power to “lay and collect Taxes.”  U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.  The taxing
power is “comprehensive,” Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 581-82, and “plenary,”
Murphy v. IRS, 493 F.3d 170, 182-83 (D.C. Cir. 2007).  A tax “does not cease to be
valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the activities
taxed.”  United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950).  As long as a statute is
“productive of some revenue,” Congress may exercise its taxing powers irrespective
of any “collateral inquiry as to the measure of the regulatory effect of a tax.” 
Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 514 (1937).  In “passing on the
constitutionality of a tax law,” a court is “concerned only with its practical operation,
not its definition or the precise form of descriptive words which may be applied to it.” 
Nelson, 312 U.S. at 363; United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268, 275 (1978) (funds
owed by operation of Internal Revenue Code had “essential character as taxes” despite
statutory label as “penalties”).
The “practical operation” of the minimum coverage provision is as a tax. 
Nelson, 312 U.S. at 363.  It amends the Internal Revenue Code to provide that a non-
exempted individual who fails to maintain a minimum level of insurance shall pay a
monthly penalty for so long as he fails to do so.  26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A.  The amount
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of the penalty is calculated as a percentage of household income for federal income
tax purposes, above a flat dollar amount and subject to a cap.  Id. § 5000A(c).  It is
reported on the individual’s federal income tax return for the taxable year, ibid., and
“assessed and collected in the same manner as” other specified federal tax penalties. 
Id. § 5000A(b)(2), (g).  Individuals who are not required to file income tax returns for
a given year are not required to pay the penalty.  Id. § 5000A(e)(2).  The taxpayer’s
responsibility for family members depends on their status as dependents under the
Internal Revenue Code.  Id. § 5000A(a), (b)(3).  Taxpayers filing a joint tax return are
jointly liable for the penalty.  Id. § 5000A(b)(3)(B).  And the Secretary of the Treasury
is empowered to enforce the penalty provision.  Id. § 5000A(g).
There is no dispute that the minimum coverage provision will be “productive
of some revenue.”  Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 514.  The CBO estimated that, by 2019, the
minimum coverage provision will yield $4 billion annually.  Letter from Douglas W.
Elmendorf, Director, CBO, to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives,
table 4 (Mar. 20, 2010); see also Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1563(a)(1), 124 Stat. 119, 270
(adopting CBO finding that the Act “will reduce the Federal deficit”).  More recent
CBO projections indicate that the provision will yield $5 billion annually by 2021. 
Letter from Elmendorf to Boehner, table 3.
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Although the taxing power may not be used to impose “punishment for an
unlawful act,” United States v. LaFranca, 282 U.S. 568, 572 (1931), the minimum
coverage provision does not impose punishment.  It does not apply retrospectively;
instead, it imposes a month-to-month penalty for a failure to maintain adequate
coverage, with liability ceasing when adequate coverage is obtained.  26 U.S.C.A.
§ 5000A(a)-(c).  The tax cannot exceed the cost of qualifying insurance, id.
§ 5000A(c), does not apply to persons below a certain income level who do not need
to file a federal income tax return, id. § 5000A(e)(2), and contains a “hardship”
exemption, id. § 5000A(e)(5).  It has no scienter requirement, and bars criminal
prosecution for failure to pay.  Id. § 5000A(g)(2)(A).
Contrary to the district court’s understanding, Congress was not required
expressly to invoke its taxing power in the Act itself.  “[T]he constitutionality of
action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes
to exercise.”  Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948).  As this Court
stated in upholding a statute as an exercise of a power that Congress had not invoked,
“‘[i]n exercising the power of judicial review,’ we look only at ‘the actual powers of
the national government.’”  United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1275 n.10
(11th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
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Nor is there any indication that Congress intended to disclaim its taxing power. 
To the contrary, the taxing power was expressly invoked in the Senate to defeat
constitutional points of order against the minimum coverage provision.  155 Cong.
Rec. S13,830, S13,832 (Dec. 23, 2009); see also H.R. Rep. No. 111-443(I), at 265
(2010).  Moreover, the legislative history of the provision shows that Congress used
terms like “excise tax” and “penalty” interchangeably.  For example, at a time when
the Senate bill used the term “excise tax,” the accompanying Senate Report described
it as a “penalty ... accounted for as an additional amount of Federal tax owed.” 
Compare S. 1796 (Oct. 19, 2009), with S. Rep. No. 111-89, at 52 (Oct. 19, 2009). 
Similarly, in the Act’s employer responsibility provision, Congress alternated among
the terms “tax,” “assessable payment,” and “assessable penalty.”  26 U.S.C.A.
§ 4980H(b)(1), (2), (c)(2)(D), (d)(1).9
  The evolution of the minimum coverage provision also confirms that use of9
the word “penalty” did not reflect any intent to disclaim the taxing power.  The Senate
bill, as initially introduced, used the word “penalty” to refer to a flat dollar amount
owed for failure to obtain minimum coverage.  H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. (2009).  An
amendment on the Senate floor used an alternative method of calculating the
assessment as a percentage of income, insofar as the assessment was greater than the
flat fee, but retained the Senate bill’s terminology.  H.R. 3590, Manager’s
Amendment (Dec. 19, 2009).  That income-based approach tracks the approach in a
parallel House bill, which called the assessment a “tax.”  H.R. 3962, 111th Cong.
(2009).  Nothing in the legislative history suggests that Congress, in incorporating
this payment, intended to change its character as a tax.
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Congress plainly did not conceal the fact that the provision operates as a tax, as
the district court suggested.  RE 400.  Congress placed the provision in the Internal
Revenue Code and required that payment be included on individual income tax
returns, an entirely transparent approach.  Moreover, during the legislative debates,
opponents of the provision attacked it as “tax,” e.g., 155 Cong. Rec. S12768 (Dec. 9,
2009) (Sen. Grassley), and congressional leaders defended it as an exercise of the
taxing power.  E.g., 156 Cong. Rec. H1854, H1882 (Mar. 21, 2010) (Rep. Miller); id.
at H1824, H1826 (Mar. 21, 2010) (Rep. Slaughter); 155 Cong. Rec. S13,751, S13,753
(Dec. 22, 2009) (Sen. Leahy); id. at S13,558, S13,581-82 (Dec. 20, 2009) (Sen.
Baucus).
In short, the minimum coverage provision is a tax in both administration and
effect.  It is enforced by the Internal Revenue Service and — in conjunction with the
rest of the Act — has been determined by the CBO and Congress to reduce the budget
deficit.  Any doubt as to the meaning of the words in the Affordable Care Act should
be construed in favor of the statute’s constitutionality.  Nw. Austin Mun. Utility Dist.
No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2513 (2009); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288,
347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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III. The District Court Impermissibly Departed from Controlling Doctrine in
Declaring the Affordable Care Act Invalid in Its Entirety and in Awarding
Relief to Parties Without Standing. 
A.  The district court accepted plaintiffs’ Article I challenge to the minimum
coverage provision but rejected all of plaintiffs’ other constitutional challenges to
various provisions of the Act.  The court nevertheless declared the Act invalid in its
entirety, concluding that it must “stand or fall as a single unit.”  RE 2075.
That ruling is indefensible.  The court itself recognized that its holding departs
from the “‘normal rule’ that reviewing courts should ordinarily refrain from
invalidating more than the unconstitutional part of a statute,” RE 2074, and that it
would have “indeterminable implications,” RE 2077.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that, “when confronting a constitutional
flaw in a statute,” courts must “try to limit the solution to the problem, severing any
problematic portions while leaving the remainder intact.”  Free Enterprise Fund v.
Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3161 (2010) (internal quotation
marks omitted).  “[T]he ‘normal rule,’” therefore, “is that ‘partial, rather than facial,
invalidation is the required course’ such that a ‘statute may ... be declared invalid to
the extent that it reaches too far, but otherwise left intact.’”  Ayotte v. Planned
Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006) (quoting Brockett v.
Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491 (1985)).  If provisions are “fully operative as a
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law,” they must be sustained “[u]nless it is evident that the Legislature would not have
enacted those provisions ... independently of that which is [invalid].”  Free Enterprise
Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3161 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 186
(1992) (quoting Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987))).
The district court recognized that the Affordable Care Act “has approximately
450 separate pieces,” RE 2074, and acknowledged that many of these provisions,
including “many [that] are already in effect and functioning,” can “stand alone and
function independently,” RE 2066-67.  The court noted, for example, that “there is
little doubt that the provision in the Act requiring employers to provide a ‘reasonable
break time’ and separate room for nursing mothers to go and express breast milk can
function without the individual mandate,” RE 2066 (internal citation omitted), and
observed that, “[i]mportantly, this provision and many others are already in effect and
functioning,” RE 2067.
The same is clearly the case for the Act’s provisions that made multiple changes
to Medicare payment rates for 2011, ACA Title III, and provisions that “provide for
more rigorous enforcement” of drug pricing requirements.  Astra USA, Inc. v. Santa
Clara County, __ S. Ct. __ (Mar. 29, 2011), 2011 WL 1119021, *4.  Other provisions
re-authorized programs already on the books, e.g., ACA §§ 4204(c), 5603, amended
the False Claims Act, ACA § 10104(j)(2), and imposed requirements to eliminate
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Medicaid waste and fraud, ACA §§ 6402(h)(2), 6411.  Still other provisions, noted by
the district court, include: “the prohibition on discrimination against providers who
will not furnish assisted suicide services; an ‘Independence at Home’ project for
chronically ill seniors; a special Medicare enrollment period for disabled veterans;
Medicare reimbursement for bone-marrow density tests; and provisions devised to
improve women’s health, prevent abuse, and ameliorate dementia, as well as
abstinence education and disease prevention.”  RE 2066 (internal citations omitted).
The court did not find it “evident” that these or the other “450 separate pieces”
of the Act are contingent on the minimum coverage provision, which does not even
take effect until 2014.  RE 2074.  Yet, the court declared these hundreds of pieces
invalid because it believed that to determine “what Congress would want to keep is
almost impossible.” Ibid.  That reasoning flies in the face of uniform Supreme Court
precedent.  Uncertainty about Congress’s intentions or an inclination to avoid close
analysis of congressional intent does not license the wholesale invalidation of
statutory provisions that “stand alone and function independently.”  RE 2066. 
Because “[a] ruling of unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of the elected
representatives of the people,” a court must “refrain from invalidating more of the
statute than is necessary.”  Regan, 468 U.S. at 652.  Thus, “whenever an act of
Congress contains unobjectionable provisions separable from those found to be
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unconstitutional, it is the duty of [the] court to so declare, and to maintain the act in
so far as it is valid.”  Ibid.
Following this binding precedent, the district court in Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli
v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 789 (E.D. Va. 2010) — the only other court to
declare the minimum coverage provision invalid — rejected an identical request to set
aside hundreds of provisions of unquestioned validity.  The district court here, by
contrast, attached unwarranted significance to the absence of a severability clause. 
RE 2068.  The Supreme Court has long held that the “ultimate determination of
severability will rarely turn on the presence or absence of such a clause.”   United
States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 585 n.27 (1968).  Thus, the Court in Free Enterprise
Fund applied the Alaska Airlines standard, even though the statute at issue in Free
Enterprise Fund had no severability clause.  Likewise, the Court in Regan emphasized
“the duty” of a court to “refrain from invalidating more of the statute than is
necessary,” 468 U.S. at 652, without reference to any severability provision.
The district court was equally wrong to declare the absence of a severability
clause “significant because one had been included in an earlier version of the Act, but
it was removed in the bill that subsequently became law.”  RE 2068.  Even if a
severability clause had been removed, the “unexplained disappearance” of text during
the progress of a bill is rarely a “reliable indicator[] of congressional intent.”  Mead
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Corp. v. Tilley, 490 U.S. 714, 723 (1989).  That principle has particular force here
because Congress legislated against the background presumption of severability. 
Indeed, both the Senate Legislative Drafting Manual and the House Legislative
Counsel’s Manual on Drafting Style “advise drafters that a ‘severability clause is
unnecessary’ unless Congress intends to make certain portions of a statute
unseverable.”  Interpreting by the Book: Legislative Drafting Manuals and Statutory
Interpretation, 120 Yale L.J. 185, 190 (2010).  The district court’s description of the
legislative history is, moreover, inaccurate.  Although a bill initially adopted by the
House contained a severability provision, none appeared in the bills considered by the
Senate or enacted as the Affordable Care Act.10
The district court also noted defendants’ recognition that the minimum coverage
provision is integral to the Act’s guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions. 
The court did not explain, however, how that relationship could justify the invalidation
of “450 separate” provisions.  RE 2074.  Moreover, even when particular provisions
are integrally related, a court may not address provisions that do not burden parties to
the litigation.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898
 The “earlier version of the Act” referred to by the district court is presumably10
H.R. 3962, a health care reform bill that the House passed in November 2009, which
contained a severability provision.  The Senate did not take up H.R. 3962 at that time,
and instead used a different House bill as the vehicle for the Senate’s version.
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(1997), is illustrative.  There, sheriffs challenged a scheme in which firearms dealers
were required to notify local law enforcement officers of proposed gun purchases, and
to delay sales for a five-day waiting period pending a background check.  The Court
held that the sheriffs could not be required to conduct background checks, but declined
to consider the claim that the related waiting period provisions were not severable. 
The Court explained that “[t]hese provisions burden only firearms dealers and
purchasers, and no plaintiff in either of those categories is before us here.”  Id. at 935. 
Although the severability claims presented “important questions,” the Court had “no
business answering them in these cases” and “decline[d] to speculate regarding the
rights and obligations of parties not before the Court.”  Ibid.  
Here, too, the multiple and varied provisions the district court declared
inseverable affect the rights and obligations of parties not before the Court.  Moreover,
by addressing a vast array of schemes, the court disregarded a range of constraints on
judicial review, such as the jurisdictional special review procedures that govern
challenges to Medicare payment rates.  Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care,
Inc., 529 U.S. 1 (2000).  Declaratory relief is “equitable in nature,” Abbott Labs. v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 155 (1967), and, as the district court itself recognized,
“[s]everability is a doctrine of judicial restraint.”  RE 2065.  The court clearly erred
in failing to exercise that restraint.
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B.  The court compounded these errors by issuing a decree that applies to parties
that failed to establish standing.  Although the court purported to issue a judgment on
behalf of all plaintiffs, the court explicitly declined to decide whether 24 of the 26
plaintiff states have standing to challenge the minimum coverage provision.  RE 2019.
Moreover, the court’s holding that two plaintiff states (Idaho and Utah) created
their own standing to challenge the minimum coverage provision by enacting statutes
that purport “to protect their citizens from forced compliance with” federal law,
RE 2017-18, is clearly incorrect.  The Supreme Court has long held that “[a] State
does not have standing as parens patriae to bring an action against the Federal
Government.” Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 610 n.16
(1982) (citing Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485-86 (1923), and Missouri
v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901)).  A state cannot circumvent this bar by codifying
its litigating position in a statute.  Insofar as Idaho and Utah assert any cognizable
rights, they are the rights of their residents.  
As the Supreme Court stressed, “it is no part of [a State’s] duty or power to
enforce [its citizens’] rights in respect of their relations with the federal government.” 
Mellon, 262 U.S. at 485-86.  Here, as in Mellon, Idaho and Utah ask the Court “to
adjudicate, not rights of person or property, not rights of dominion over physical
domain, not quasi sovereign rights actually invaded or threatened, but abstract
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questions of political power, of sovereignty, of government.”  Id. at 484-85.  And, as
the Supreme Court held in Mellon, such assertions do not present a justiciable issue.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court should be reversed.
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